why domestic haleu supply matters

Published: July 2026

High-assay low-enriched uranium, or HALEU, is emerging as one of the most important materials in the next phase of U.S. nuclear energy. It is also one of the hardest to get. The shortage is not caused by a lack of interest in advanced reactors, but by a mismatch between fast-growing demand and a domestic fuel supply chain that is still being rebuilt. The U.S. Department of Energy says HALEU is needed by many advanced reactor designs because it can support smaller reactor cores, longer operating cycles and higher fuel efficiency than conventional low-enriched uranium.

• Read more: DOE’s HALEU Availability Program

The most immediate problem is that HALEU is not yet available at commercial scale from U.S. suppliers. DOE has stated that HALEU “is not currently available from domestic suppliers” and that gaps in supply could delay advanced reactor deployment. That creates a bottleneck for reactor developers that need firm fuel commitments before they can finalize designs, build demonstration units or move toward commercial operations. DOE created the HALEU Availability Program under the Energy Act of 2020 to help ensure access to HALEU for domestic research, demonstration and commercial use.

The shortage is also a legacy problem. For decades, the United States allowed large portions of its uranium enrichment capacity to atrophy while relying on foreign suppliers for enriched uranium. DOE says the United States imports 20% to 25% of its enriched uranium from Russia, while a 2024 DOE summary said Russia supplies about 44% of global uranium enrichment services and 20% to 30% of enriched uranium product used in the United States and Europe. That dependence is especially problematic for HALEU because Russia has historically been the only commercial-scale source of the material for many advanced reactor needs (source: RTO Insider).

U.S. policy has added urgency to the supply challenge. The Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act bans imports of Russian low-enriched uranium beginning Aug. 11, 2024, with DOE allowed to grant limited waivers under specific conditions. The waiver authority ends no later than Jan. 1, 2028, which gives U.S. utilities, fuel companies and advanced reactor developers a narrow window to reduce reliance on Russian enrichment services. The law is designed to strengthen energy security, but it also increases pressure on domestic and allied suppliers to scale up quickly.

Read more:

• DOE Russian uranium waiver guidance
• Federal Register waiver notice
• State Department statement

Demand, meanwhile, is expected to rise sharply. DOE projections cited by the American Nuclear Society indicate that advanced reactor deployment could require more than 40 metric tons of HALEU by 2030. That is far above the country’s initial domestic production capacity. DOE said in April 2024 that the American Centrifuge Project in Piketon, Ohio, had produced more than 100 kilograms of HALEU and was working toward an additional 900 kilograms. The gap between kilogram-scale demonstration production and tens of metric tons of expected demand explains why HALEU remains scarce.

The supply chain challenge extends beyond enrichment. HALEU often must be converted into forms that reactor fuel fabricators can use, including metal or oxide. DOE awarded contracts to six companies for HALEU deconversion services and said up to $800 million is available for that portion of the supply chain. Without sufficient deconversion capacity, enriched HALEU material may not be available in the chemical or physical form required by advanced reactor developers.

• See also: DOE HALEU deconversion services

Transportation is another constraint. DOE says there are limited licensed options to transport HALEU in the United States, and the use of highly enriched uranium casks can make shipment of large quantities costly and time-consuming. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been preparing to review and certify HALEU transportation packages, including packages for uranium oxide powder, pellets, uranium hexafluoride and TRISO fuel. Until transportation options expand, HALEU availability will depend not only on production but also on the ability to safely and economically move material through the fuel cycle.

Federal investment is beginning to address these gaps. DOE has committed billions of dollars to strengthen domestic enrichment capacity, including low-enriched uranium and HALEU infrastructure. The department also has pursued HALEU acquisition, deconversion, transportation research and environmental reviews to help create an end-to-end supply chain.

Still, the shortage is likely to persist until multiple parts of the supply chain mature at the same time. Enrichment capacity must scale. Deconversion and fuel fabrication must be ready. Transportation packages must be certified. Reactor developers must create bankable demand. The result is a classic early-market problem: Advanced reactors need HALEU to move forward, but HALEU suppliers need committed customers to justify large capital investments.

For now, HALEU is in short supply because the United States is trying to build a new advanced nuclear fuel market while replacing a foreign-dependent enrichment system in real time. The opportunity is significant, but so is the execution risk. Without faster progress across enrichment, deconversion, transportation and fuel fabrication, HALEU could remain one of the most important limiting factors in the deployment of advanced nuclear reactors.